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Abstract.The injured party’s own conduct contributing to the damage suffered has been a bar to the recovery of 
damages in delictual liability for centuries, both in the traditions of civil as well as common law. This article 
describes and compares the historical development, from (classical) Roman law up to French, German and Dutch 
law in the beginning of the 20th century, of the method with which cases involving the behaviour of the injured 
party contributed to the occurrence of damage – nowadays called ‘contributory negligence’, with the English 
common law tradition from the medieval period until the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act of 1945. In 
both the civil and the common law traditions, the result of ‘contributory negligence’ was the same – all or nothing. 
Solutions found in civil and common law to deal with the contributory conduct of the injured party are not very 
different. There might have been remarkable similarities in the way one solved this issue before a concept of 
contributory negligence existed. Furthermore, whilst the official introduction of the partition of damages as a result 
of contributory negligence came later in common law than in civil law, early signs of the adoption of this principle 
can be also be found in 19th century common law. 
Keywords: contributory negligence; tort law; damages; causation; common law; comparative law
1. INTRODUCTION 
The two legal families of (Romanic) civil law and (English) common law have had a great 
impact on contemporary law in Western Europe. Although these traditions have different 
origins, it does not mean that later developments are fundamentally different. Due to the 
different basis (and characteristics) of the two traditions, it may not be expected that, when 
it comes to concrete legal problems, there might be more similarities in the developments 
of legal concepts in both systems than one might initially think. This article looks at the 
differences and similarities between the tradition of civil law and (English) common law in 
the law of delict/tort law by analysing how questions of ‘contributory negligence’, i.e. cases 
in which the behaviour of the injured party contributed to the occurrence of damages, were 
historically solved. The key question will be whether cases in which the behaviour of the 
injured party contributed to the occurrence of damage were solved in the same way in civil 
and common law. The contribution of the injured party’s own conduct to the damage 
suffered has been a bar to the recovery of damages for centuries, in the tradition of civil as 
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well as in common law.1 The legal concept of contributory (or comparative) negligence as 
known today was however unknown in both traditions in the medieval and early modern 
periods. This article considers the developments from that period up the beginning of the 
20th century, when the concept of contributory negligence had been firmly established in 
both traditions. For the civil law tradition, the description of the development will start with 
the (classical) origin of the Roman law, texts that that, in Justinian form, provided the basis 
for the later development in the period of medieval ius commune.
Under common law, the concept of contributory negligence is no defence for a breach 
of contract and thus only applies to tort law.2 It is a defence in contract law and leads to a 
reduction of the amount of damages to be paid in civil law jurisdictions e.g., France and 
Germany.3 Hungarian law holds the same position, see § 6:144 (1) jo. 6:5252 of the 
Hungarian Civil Code of 2013. In this article, contributory conduct will be shown, in both 
traditions, to be linked to the (broader) question of causation. The development in the civil 
law tradition will be dealt with in chronological order in Section 2; Roman law in Antiquity 
(Section 2.1); the medieval period (Section 2.2); the early modern period (Section 2.3) and 
the period upto the beginning of the twentieth century (Section 2.4). Following the 
development of the way in which cases concerning contributory conduct were solved in the 
common law tradition will be dealt with in Section 3, in two parts. The first part gives an 
overview of the main theories within the common law tradition, in which contributory 
negligence, if legally relevant, could only lead to a denial of a claim for damages. This part, 
too, is presented chronologically, discussing first the medieval and early modern period 
(Section 3.2) and then the 19th and 20th century (Section 3.3). The second part will single 
out cases that, in one way or another, indicate some rebellion against, or mitigation of, the 
leading case law and thus paved the way for a partition of damages (Section 3.4). Finally, in 
conclusion, it will be shown that, with regard to the substantive law of contributory 
negligence, the often-stated assumption that common and civil law are very different is 
(partly) erroneous, as there are some remarkable similarities in the way this issue was 
solved even before the concept of contributory negligence formally existed (Section 4).
2. THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION4
2.1. The casuistic practical approach of the Roman jurists
In Roman law, the relevant provisions on cases where the injured party contributed to their 
own loss can be found in the lex Aquilia (probably dating from 286 or 287 BC),5 which 
concerned the delict damnum iniuria datum (unlawful inflicted damage). Based on the first 
chapter of the lex Aquilia, a fine had to be paid in the event of the unlawful killing of 
another’s slave or four-footed beast of the class of cattle.6 In the third chapter, a fine had to 
1 See, on the development in civil law, elaborately Van Dongen (2014a).
2 See e.g. Law Commission (1993) 4; Beale (2015) 26–77.
3 Law Commission (1993) 8; Zimmermann (2014) 212–3.
4 This summary of the development of contributory negligence in the civil law tradition is based 
on Van Dongen (2014a).
5 See e.g. Kaser (1971) 161; Watson (1984) 234.
  6 Gai. D.2.2pr.
326 EMANUEL G.D. VAN DONGEN, HENRIËTTE P. VERDAM
be paid in the event of burning, shattering, or breaking of another’s slave, four-footed beast 
of the class of cattle or other tangible property.7
Analysis of the primary sources has shown that in (post-)classical Roman law, 
a specific legal notion of contributory negligence, as known today, did not exist.8 
The examples of the Digest show that technical (dogmatic) theories are often absent from 
the replies of classical jurists to private citizens (responsa) in cases that, from a functional 
perspective, can be considered as ‘contributory negligence’ cases. Furthermore, theories of 
causation applied to e.g. D.9.2.9.4, containing the rule that the causal nexus between the act 
of the wrongdoer and the damage might be broken by an act of the injured party, do not 
satisfactory solve the problem. Such defence is not accepted in cases where the wrongdoer 
does act wilfully, even though the result ought to be the same regardless of the intentional 
or merely negligent nature of the act.9 The Roman jurists did not apply a theory of culpae 
compensatio to cases10 – medieval and modern scholars forced this theory on the Roman 
sources.11 The Roman jurists merely enquired whether the injury, considering the 
circumstances, was due to the negligence (culpa) of the wrongdoer. Certain Digest texts, 
such as the text of the javelin thrower (D.9.2.9.4), show that Roman jurists approached 
the culpa requirement in a casuistic manner.12 Often the matter was approached using the 
status theory of Hermagoras of Temnos (2nd cent. BC), which allowed a more precise 
argument on the legal problem at stake.13 This is a method to determine what is at issue in a 
case that results from rhetorical arguments. The term status refers to the nature of the 
quaestio resulting from the confrontation between a claim and a defence.14 This theory had 
a central place in the search for arguments used by jurists to substantiate their decision 
persuasively.15 
The only and final question in classical Roman law was whether the wrongdoer had 
been at fault (culpa) or not due to the penal character of the actio legis Aquiliae (the actio 
based on the lex Aquilia) and to the wording of the lex Aquilia. In the formulary procedure, 
the iudex’s only possibility was to condemn the defendant to pay the poena if convinced 
that the requirements of the formula were fulfilled, otherwise he had to absolve the 
defendant. The possibility to reduce the poena – due to the negligence of the injured party – 
did not exist.16 In that respect, in classical Roman law, it was not possible to balance of the 
culpable behaviour of the two parties, but only to asses of the culpable behaviour of the 
wrongdoer. Consequently, looking at the preponderant negligence is also nonsensical for 
classical Roman law.17
  7 Ulp. D.9.2.27.5.
  8 Van Dongen (2014a) 13–104.
  9 Buckland, McNair & Lawson (1974) 372; Buckland & Stein (2007) 587; Van Dongen 
(2014a) 65.
10 Differently see Pernice (1867) 60–2; Von Lübtow (1971) 106, 136.
11 Van Dongen (2014a) 94, 103 and also already Valditara (1994) 862.
12 See also Zimmermann (1996) 1008.
13 This was for example the case in Alfenus D.9.2.52.1. See on this text also Van Dongen (2010) 
163–76.
14 Leesen (2009) 35.
15 Van Dongen (2014a) 50–1.
16 See also Wollschläger (1976) 135.
17 An elaborate discussion of this theory as well as of its origin can be found in Van Dongen 
(2014a).
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This important characteristic, the all-or-nothing approach, was retained in Justinian 
law (sixth cent.) and enforced until the lex Aquilia lost its penal character, only in early 
modern times. In Justinian law, the fragments concerning the lex Aquilia, written by various 
Roman jurists, could be read in relation to each other, as they were now promulgated by 
Emperor Justinian (482–565) as being part of one and the same title. Furthermore, they 
could be read in relation to other texts of Justinian’s compilation, such as D.50.17.203 
(Quod quis ex culpa sua damnum sentit, non intellegitur damnum sentire), a rule which was 
regarded as a general principle from that time on. This became a general rule by being 
placed into the title De diversis regulis iuris antiqui – the original (classical) context was 
something totally different, namely the law of legacies.18 Because of the formulation as a 
regula, it was generally set up as an abstract principle, both valid for delictual and 
contractual remedies.19 Therefore, it was not possible to claim recovery in Justinian law if 
the victim caused his injury by his own fault. There could be no consequences of 
contributory negligence other than a denial of claims based on the insufficiency in the 
requirements of the actio legis Aquiliae. It is inconceivable that a restriction of the 
obligation to pay full compensation, in the sense that the wrongdoer was only liable for part 
of the damage was recognised in Justinian law.20 
There are just some scattered texts in the Digest in which the behaviour of the injured 
party results in the restriction of the amount of damage to be paid by the wrongdoer, namely 
to be found in contract law (D.19.1.11.12 and D.19.1.45.1).21 There are no traces of a 
general rule based on a generalisation of these texts in post-classical times. Furthermore, 
there is no dogmatical foundation for the view that a restriction of liability of the wrongdoer 
existed and can be found in D.50.17.203, nor did this text refer to mutual blame of both 
parties.22
2.2.  Legal discussions on the contributory act of the injured party  
in the Medieval period
According to the glossators, the injured party (owner of the slave/object) could petition for 
an actio legis Aquiliae when someone inflicted damage to someone else’s property. 
The requirements for a successful action were that the act causing the damage was unlawful 
(iniuria); that the damage had to be inflicted as a result of the negligence (culpa) of the 
wrongdoer – i.e. not acting with due care23 and that there was a causal connection.24
The question of how to qualify the act of the injured party in legal terms was first 
explicitly discussed in medieval times, when a discussion of the acts of both parties 
concerned could be observed for the first time. In medieval Roman legal scholarship, the 
contributory negligence of the injured party seems to have been regarded as reproachable 
18 Lenel (1889) pal. nr. 6.260; see on the original (classical) context Van Dongen (2014a) 
16–30.
19 Aumann (1964) 31; Van Dongen (2014a) 30.
20 Van Dongen (2014a) 100.
21 Luig (1969) 193; see Medicus (1962) 322–3; Aumann (1964) 14 et seq.
22 Van Dongen (2014a) 101–2.
23 I.e. what can be foreseen by a diligent person (D.9.2.31); later Bartolus, in his commentary 
on D.16.3.32., argued that liability consists in any deviation from the diligence of a careful person. 
See also Hallebeek (2001) esp. 76–7; Descamps (2005) 76–7.
24 See also Descamps (2005) 27.
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misconduct to be sanctioned by a refusal of any claim for damages.25 Two starting points 
for the problem of contributory negligence can be identified in this period. The first starting 
point is the doctrine of culpae compensatio; the second starting point is identified in the 
rule laid down in D.50.17.203.26 The first starting point was the doctrine of culpae 
compensatio, meaning, according to the glossators, that the contributory negligence of the 
injured party (culpa) excluded the fault and therefore all liability of the wrongdoer. 
According to Johannes Bassianus (†1197), this would lead to the following result when 
applied to the case of the javelin thrower (D.9.2.9.4).27 The fault (culpa) of the wrongdoer 
(the javelin thrower) is compensated by the negligent act (culpa) of the injured party and is 
therefore neutralised. For that reason the javelin thrower was relived from his own culpa.28 
A comparison of the amount of negligence and a refinement in the sense that a small 
degree of contributory negligence would not lead to compensatio and thus to the deprivation 
of the possibility to claim compensation for damages/fine, was probably made by the 
successors to the glossators at the instigation of the canonists. Some medieval Roman legal 
scholars used this doctrine of culpae compensatio to solve problems of contributory 
negligence in cases of damnum iniuria datum, especially Paulus de Castro (ca. 1360/62–
1441). As to the second starting point, Accursius (ca. 1182–1263) linked D.50.17.203 to the 
law of delicts, namely by the allegation of D.9.2.31.29 According to Accursius, an injured 
party’s own negligence prevented him from claiming damages from someone else. 
D.50.17.203 can be understood in the sense that it only concerns negligence by the injured 
party. Works of other glossators and the works of the commentators show that the legal rule 
of D.50.17.203 was interpreted as only concerning cases in which only the injured party 
was at fault, not cases of contributory negligence. However, Accursius understood it as not 
only concerning cases in which the negligence of the wrongdoer was not at all under 
discussion, but also in cases in which that was indeed the case, i.e. cases of contributory 
negligence.
In medieval canon law, as in medieval Roman law, a wrongdoer was only liable when 
he was at fault (culpa).30 The notion of culpa in canon law was slightly different from that 
in medieval Roman law. Culpa could exist either when acting in contravention of legal 
provisions or when doing something permissible but without using the required diligence.31 
Although the canonists based their assessment of liability on the two elements of damage 
(damnum) and fault (culpa) without mentioning the causal relation between the damage and 
the act that caused the damage as a separate requirement, this way of assessment indirectly 
forced them to consider the problem of causation.32 According to canon law, the contributory 
negligence of the injured party can be seen as contributory causation (co-causation) and 
therefore in such cases it had to be established whether the wrongdoer or the injured party 
25 Also the medieval jurists understood the obligation to pay compensation for damages as a 
penal sanction; see Jansen (2007) 530–1, 660.
26 In this sense see also Luig (1969) 198.
27 See e.g. gloss quia non debuit with siglum Io. ad D.9.2.9.4 in Ms. Paris BN, lat. 4459, fo. 
90va., written by Johannes Bassianus, adopted by Accursius in gloss quia non debuit ad D.9.2.9.4. 
28 See e.g. gloss quia non debuit with siglum Io. ad D.9.2.9.4 in Ms. Paris BN, lat. 4459, fo. 
90va., written by Johannes Bassianus, adopted by Accursius in gloss quia non debuit ad D.9.2.9.4.
29 See Accursian gloss Quod quis ad D.50.17.203.
30 X.5.36.9.
31 Kuttner (1935) 201, 225–6; Gordley (2006) 190–1, 196.
32 Von Mehren & Gordley (1977); Parisi (1992) 106–7; Van Dongen (2014a) 150.
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produced the proximate cause (causa proxima).33 It seems that the causational contributions 
of both parties were compared but causation and fault seem not to have been separated in 
this period. 
The canonists also embraced the theory of culpae compensatio in various areas of law, 
generally in those areas not dealing with the law of delicts or in cases of the law of delicts 
in which both persons were laymen.34 However, this was different with regard to the 
question of whether a cleric could be granted a higher ordination, according to the 
commentary of Animal on D.50 c.50, because in that case culpa could never be compensated 
by culpa. The author of the Animal also stated that when the wrongdoer and the person 
killed had both acted culpably, even if the culpability of the first was less serious, the cleric 
could never be promoted to a higher rank.35 Based on some later canon law cases, which 
did not concern delictual claims based on unlawfully caused damage, it could be argued, as 
some modern scholars do, that the liability of the tortfeasor in question is cancelled out 
because of the preponderant contributory negligence (culpa maior) of the injured party.36 
The majority of the commentaries of the decretalists do not follow such a culpa maior 
theory. Furthermore, one should be careful with reaching the conclusion that, due to the 
lack of a possibility to distribute the damages over both parties in case of contributory 
negligence (which was not at all at stake in the cases of X.5.12.8 and X.5.12.9), the jurists 
tended to attribute the ‘sole guilt’ to the party that acted with the highest degree of 
negligence (analogous interpretation). Only when the negligence of the injured party was 
more serious than that of the wrongdoer would the liability of the latter fall out of the 
picture. In later developments the canonists usually solved contributory negligence issues 
by using the rule in D.50.17.203, which was somewhat modified in the compilation of 
Bonifacius VIII (r. 1294–1304), i.e. the Liber Sextus (1298). It concerns the rule that one 
has to impute the damage that someone suffers due to one’s own negligence to himself, not 
to others.37 Furthermore, towards the end of the medieval period, mainly in consilia 
literature, the term culpa admixta (literally ‘mixed fault’) was used to qualify the behaviour 
of the injured party in a way that led to the exclusion of the liability of the wrongdoer. 
In this way contributory negligence led to a denial of a claim without a discussion of the 
degree of the negligence of each party.38 
A similar all-or-nothing approach was followed in the event of ‘contributory 
negligence’ already in some other medieval sources outside the Roman-canonical tradition 
(iura propria – indigenous laws). A division of damages was not made in either Roman law 
or in medieval ius commune. However, this idea of a division of damages can be found in 
some cases39 in other old traditions, e.g. medieval Irish law.40 Contributory negligence of 
33 Luig (1969) 201; Van Dongen (2014a) 152.
34 See X.5.16.6, the decision of Pope Gregory IX in VI.1.21.1, Dynus de Mugello ad VI.5.12.65 
and by Hostiensis in his Summa on the title De damno dato.
35 Animal est substantia (2016) at link 1, ad D.50 c.50
36 Only two remarks by the influential Bernardus Parmensis (†1266), see gloss Romanis 
Pontificis ad X.5.12.8, and Hostiensis (Henricus de Segusio, ca. 1200–1271), see his Commentaria ad 
X.5.12.9, nr. 2, can provide an indication of the fact that this theory was applied. See Van Dongen 
(2014a) 146 et seq.
37 See also Lange (1955) 72–3; Luig (1969) 203.
38 See e.g. Cravetta (1611) cons. 119, nr. 11.
39 Van Dongen (2014a) 182–3.
40 See Bretha Étgid § 30.
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the injured party could lead to partial compensation, the judicium rusticorum, or to a 
reduction of damages to the amount of two-thirds. This judicium rusticorum is interesting 
as it appeared again in later periods of legal history, such as in Roman-Dutch law.
2.3. Various techniques to solve ‘contributory negligence’ in the early modern period
The Aquilian concepts have sometimes been said to have framed legal thinking on 
extracontractual liability since the reception of Roman law.41 However, the question is what 
exactly has been received of the lex Aquilia. By the end of the 17th century, it had become 
manifest that modern law in action no longer reflected the Aquilian delict of the Corpus 
iuris civilis.42 A general action for damage done unlawfully was provided; an action that 
was only Roman in its name. Around 1700, the general action for damages lost its penal 
character throughout Europe.43 In other respects the lex Aquilia was still considered the 
basis for delictual liability. The concept of culpa remained essentially the same; 
wrongfulness remained an essential prerequisite for Aquilian liability. A general theory of 
causation was never developed or applied.44 The adagium Nam qui occasionem damni 
praestat, damnum fecisse videtur (derived from D.9.2.30.3) was maintained as a criterion 
for causality in legal doctrine; the question whether the wrongdoer gave the occasion for 
the damage was often linked up with the broader problem of fault.45
An injured party still had no right to claim damages if his negligence contributed to the 
occurrence of the damage; an all-or-nothing approach still applied. Some humanists 
envisaged the possibility of partial compensation – the first time in the continental Roman 
law tradition.46 Regarding the substantive law, the humanists were sometimes more strongly 
rooted in the tradition of mos italicus than might be expected. In writings, there is, amongst 
others, the application of the culpae compensatio but also the first traces of the maior culpa 
approach.47 In general, in this early modern period, the idea that an equal or preponderant 
contributory negligence (maior culpa) excluded the right to claim compensation began to 
gain acceptance. However, not all jurists followed this theory and this was not the only 
method used to deal with the problem of ‘contributory negligence’. Other theories were 
also applied and other techniques were used to solve the problem.48
The issue of contributory negligence is solved in an alternative way in one of these 
solutions which was applied in Germany and Italy. In the event of injuries suffered in a 
quarrel, the person who provoked the fight was regarded as the auctor rixae. The auctor 
rixae could not claim damages for his injuries unless the other person had exceeded the 
limits of normal selfdefence. In Italy, the Rota Romana sometimes held the view that 
contributory negligence, no matter how small, had to lead to the dismissal of a claim for 
compensation, while in other cases the Rota required culpa maior on the side of the injured 
party.49
41 See e.g. Jansen (2004) 450.
42 Coing (1985) 509–10; Zimmermann (1990) 68; 1996 (1018).
43 Dondorp (1998) 64–5, 70.
44 Van Dongen (2014a) 225.
45 Kaufmann (1958) 65; Zimmermann (1990) 78.
46 See Faber (1618) ad D.50.17.203; De Sande (1681) ad D.50.17.203.
47 See chapter 4 of Van Dongen (2014a).
48 Chapter 4 of Van Dongen (2014a)
49 See Van Dongen (2014a) 281 et seq.
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A different starting point compared to Roman law was taken in Roman-Dutch law in 
ship-collision cases. If two ships collided and both had acted negligently, there were two 
main views on what the law dictated: (1) If the negligence was equal on both sides, the 
damage had to be regarded as common and both parties had to bear the damage in equal 
proportions (the view of the Supreme Court of Holland, Zeeland and West-Friesland);50 
(2) Each party should bear its own loss, because whoever had been negligent could not 
bring an action and the damage that occurred was not regarded as damage cf. D.50.17.203.51 
Another problem was to determine what the law dictated in case a stationary ship was 
hit by a moving ship. Dionysius G. van der Keessel (1738–1816) considered the negligence 
of the latter as more serious, and therefore no culpae compensatio (marking the application 
of the ius commune theory) could take place. Thus one ship had to bear 50 per cent of the 
damage of the other ship, and so something quite similar to the idea of a division of damage 
occurred.52 This was like the old tradition of judicium rusticorum but with one new aspect, 
that in case of culpa maior 50 per cent of the damage of the other party had to be paid.
Some natural law jurists did apply the rule of D.50.17.203 in cases of contributory 
negligence, and in doing so, denied the claim for compensation. Others applied the criterion 
of culpa maior and only denied the claim for compensation if the contributory negligence 
of the injured party was more serious than the negligence of the wrongdoer.53 The possible 
attribution of damage both to the wrongdoer and to the injured party (according to the 
respective faults or causal contributions) had its origin in the ‘Aufklärungstheorie’ of 
Christian Wolff (1679–1754)54 and is therefore a relatively recent phenomenon. The 
assessment and balancing of the respective gradations of the negligence of both parties was 
already a step in that direction. So, although Wolff was the first legal scholar who turned 
away from the ‘all-or-nothing principle’, his theory can also be considered a continuation of 
the preceding development. Wolff did not treat the matter of contributory negligence in an 
abstract way, but only for some concrete cases. In particular, no remarks are found as to the 
relation with the delictual obligation to pay damages.55
2.4. The concept of contributory negligence in the nineteenth century56
Wolff’s doctrine seems to have been codified for the first time in § 1304 of the Austrian 
Allgemeine Bürgerliche Gesetzbuch (1811), the same article in which judicial discretion is 
provided as to the consequences of contributory negligence. 57 In French law, the Code civil 
of 1804 did not contain a general rule on contributory negligence. The topic was dealt with 
50 See Neostadius (1667) decisio nr. 49.
51 Cf. D.50.17.203; see Van Bijnkershoek (1744) IV.22, and Van der Keessel (1860) thesis 816.
52 Van Dongen (2014a) 254–5. On the topic of contributory negligence in collision cases see 
also Van Dongen (2013) 601–10.
53 See Van Dongen (2014a) 285 et seq.
54 Wolff (1750) § 283. See, on the new approach of Chr. Wolff, Van Dongen (2014a) 295–8.
55 In this respect, an older case contained in the Selectae decisiones of Wolffgang A. Schoepff is 
a much clearer example of a partial compensation of damages in the event of liability for unlawful 
caused damage, in the sense that some specific sorts of damage (namely the costs of maintenance) 
could not be recoverable because of the contributory negligence of the injured party. See Schoepff 
(1726) dec. 192, nr. 5.
56 On the 19th century development see also Van Dongen (2014b).
57 The influence of Wolff on the ABGB was effected by means of Karl A.F. von Martini (1726–
1800) and Franz on Zeiller (1751–1828). See Luig (1969) 232; Jansen (2007) 676.
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in case law and in particular by the Cour de cassation. The partition, made on the basis of 
the gravity of faults, was accepted by the majority of legal scholars and judges who initially 
denied the full claim in case of contributory negligence.58 This changed at the end of the 
nineteenth century, when the situation in which the injured party and the wrongdoer were at 
fault (characterised as faute commune)59 led to a partition of damages proportionate to the 
gravity of the faults on each side.60
The situation in nineteenth-century Germany was different. Although the Historical 
School defended the view that no compensation had to be provided if the injured party had 
committed (any) contributory negligence, some applied the maior culpa doctrine. The 
pandectists tried to find new dogmatic reasons to justify the denial of a claim in the event of 
contributory negligence. Their theories were mainly causation theories, based on the 
thought of an interruption of the causal connection in the case of contributory negligence. 
A theory (often) connected to this was the culpae compensatio theory, based on the rule of 
D.50.17.203. Later, equity was regarded as the foundation of the rule of D.50.17.203.61 
Regarding the all-or-nothing approach, it was generally stated that individual consequential 
losses for which the injured party was responsible could not be imputed to the wrongdoer. 
This was in fact a first attempt to escape the all-or-nothing approach (and the tradition of 
ius commune). In legal practice, a small degree of contributory negligence already led to a 
denial of a claim. However, to avoid unfair solutions, this approach was increasingly 
opposed in legal practice. A reduction of the amount of damages in the event of contributory 
negligence was accepted for the first time by the German Reichsgericht in 1883.62 Somewhat 
earlier, the natural law solution in Switzerland (particularly in Article 51 II of the 
Schweizerische Obligationenrecht 1881) had been codified under the influence of (§ 1304 
of) the Austrian Allgemeine Bürgerliche Gesetzbuch (1811) as well as the French doctrine. 
Eventually, the Swiss code, regarding the problem of contributory negligence, was taken as 
an example by the drafters of the German Bürgerliche Gesetzbuch (1900) and, also under 
the influence of case law, the Swiss regulation was adopted in its entirety in § 254. In the 
application of the concept of Mitverschulden – whose legal doctrinal basis is much debated 
– leads to an apportionment based on the circumstances of the case, with an emphasis on 
the preponderant causation. Although the primary standard is causation, the secondary 
standard is a review of the other circumstances (among which negligence). 63
In the Netherlands, the Civil Code (Burgerlijk Wetboek) of 1838 did not contain a 
general provision on contributory negligence. Up to 1916 lower case law rarely applied a 
58 For the older cases in which compensation was denied because of contributory negligence, 
see C Lyon 17 January 1844, S. 1844.2.401 and C Douai 14 December 1846, JdP 1848, 492; see also, 
e.g., Mazeaud & Mazeaud (1970) 625; Honoré (1983) 95.
59 The term in itself is inaccurate, since in the situation under study the two parties, wrongdoer 
and injured party, have nothing in common: neither the damage, nor the fault. Therefore, it is more 
correct to refer to this as a concurrence of faults – although the contributory fault of the injured party 
is of different nature than the fault of the wrongdoer. See also Le Tourneau (2004) 444.
60 See Van Dongen (2014a) 315–6.
61 Van Dongen (2014a) 319–21.
62 Reichsgericht 15 October 1883, RGZ 10, 74, 80–1; Aumann (1964) 172.
63 Although § 254 aimed at the predominant causation (vorwiegende Verursachung), the 
Reichsgericht continued to apply the doctrine of the main fault and this means that the predominant 
causation seems to have been already interpreted from the start of the twentieth century as 
überwiegendes Verschulden. See Van Dongen (2014a) 315–6.
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partition of damages in cases of contributory negligence. In the event of contributory 
negligence the claim was usually denied, (implicitly) based on the rule contained in 
D.50.17.203 or based on the culpae compensatio doctrine. The legal basis of the denial of 
damages to the injured party in the event that their act had contributed to their own damage 
was disputed, although the majority view became that equity demanded the denial of a 
claim and that the damage should be imputed to the victim if they could have prevented the 
accident from occurring.64 In cases where the culpae compensatio doctrine was applied one 
often balanced the degree of negligence of the wrongdoer with the contributory negligence 
of the injured party; the right for compensation was only denied when the contributory 
negligence of the injured party was more serious than the negligence of the wrongdoer 
(culpa maior). The all-or-nothing approach ended with the judgement of the Dutch Supreme 
Court in civil and criminal cases (Hoge Raad) in 1916, in which the court decided that the 
duty to compensate had to be measured, based on the extent to which the negligence of both 
parties contributed to the damage.65
3. THE COMMON LAW TRADITION66
3.1. Medieval and early modern common law
3.1.1. Introduction
Roman law was not received in English common law to the same degree received upon the 
continent but Roman law has definitely had some influence on the concepts, terminology 
and principles of English common law.67 Some thoughts on the topic of contributory 
negligence have also been taken from Roman law.68 It is interesting that the 13th century 
English jurist Henry de Bracton (c. 1210–1268), an ecclesiastic and royal judge, referred to 
Roman law, namely D.9.2.11pr., in his exposé on homicide through misadventure and 
accidents.69 Apparently in cases of (criminally sued) crimes, the behavior of the injured 
party was irrelevant.70 However, the concept of contributory negligence cannot be found as 
such in the medieval common law of delicts. Furthermore, a general principle of 
contributory negligence in this period was implausible, due to the various narrow forms of 
action.71 Nevertheless, there were some cases which, when considered from a modern 
contemporary perspective, dealt with the problem of ‘contributory negligence’; these will 
be discussed in the following sections.
64 Van Dongen (2014a) 325–6.
65 Hoge Raad 4 February 1916, NJ 1916, p. 450. See on this case, elaborately, Van Dongen 
(2014b).
66 The part on English law has already been published, but more elaborately, and in a slightly 
different form, as Van Dongen & Verdam (2016) 61–74.
67 See elaborately Re (1961) 447 et seq.
68 Wharton (1874) 265, even claimed that the principle of Pomponius in D.50.17.203 – stating 
that he who suffers loss due to his own negligence is not considered to have suffered loss – was 
reaffirmed in Anglo-American jurisprudence.
69 Bracton, De legibus, 384 [ed. with an English translation by Thorne (1968)].
70 The discourse on homicide by Bernard of Pavia was transplanted and by that the scheme of 
responsibility: in a case of accidental homicide, a man was only acquitted if his act was lawful and if 
he had used due care. See Pollock & Maitland (1923) 477.
71 The remaining part of this article will focus on the tort of negligence.
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3.1.2. Interruption of the causal connection between an act and damage
The courts in the medieval and early modern period gave form to almost all contemporary 
institutions of limitation of liability by means of causal imputation. This also applied to 
‘contributory negligence’. Rather than using a concept of contributory negligence, it was 
examined whether the harm was caused by the plaintiff’s own act, i.e. whether the plaintiff 
themself were responsible for the proximate cause. That the proximity of causation was the 
prerequisite for the liability of the defendant becomes clear from the Cattle case, also 
referred to as Godfrey v. Godfrey (1470). In this case the plaintiff, the injured party, sued the 
defendant for trespass because the defendant’s animals had strayed from the road into the 
adjoining close, which belonged to the plaintiff. The Court denied the plaintiff’s claim 
because it came to the conclusion that the damage was caused by not properly securing the 
close and thus by the plaintiff’s own conduct.72 According to this reasoning the plaintiff’s 
claim was either accepted or denied in full, no halfway solution was possible – i.e. an all-
or-nothing approach.73 No contributory negligence was at stake in this case, because the 
notion of negligence had not yet arisen. Liability for trespass was strict, rather than fault-
based, so all issues, such as ‘contributory negligence’, had to be based on causation.74 
The wrongdoer’s responsibility only extended to the direct consequences of his act; the 
(negligent) conduct of the injured party could be used to question the direct connection 
between the damage and the behaviour of the wrongdoer. The injured party could not 
therefore claim damages if their act had been the effective cause (the direct, proximate 
cause) of the damage.75 This way of thinking was clearly influenced by the canon law 
distinction between causa proxima and causa remota (see par. 2.2).76 [In some 17th and 
18th century cases in which the conduct of the injured party contributed to his loss, the 
causal connection between the act and the damage was also of major importance.77 For 
example, in] Brock v. Copeland (1794), Lord Kenyon (1732–1802) decided in a case where 
the plaintiff had, without any caution, entered a yard with a dog after it had been shut and 
was bitten by the dog, that the owner of the dog was not at fault. If the dog was kept on the 
premises of the defendant and the injury was due to the imprudence of the plaintiff entering 
those premises, the action could not be maintained.78
3.1.3. Appearance of negligence
Negligence only became a basis for liability in the late 18th century and thus it was only 
from that period onwards that a denial of a claim based on contributory negligence became 
possible.79 There are nevertheless some cases that point to an early acceptance of the 
relevance of (contributory) negligence for liability or at least indicate a reformulation of the 
72 Godfrey v. Godfrey (1470) Y.B. 10 Ed. IV Pasch pl. 19. See also, e.g., Holdsworth (1966a) 
378 et seq. 
73 Koppe (1970) 33 et seq.
74 Ibbetson (1999) 58 et seq.
75 See, e.g., Holdsworth (1966a) 378 and Holdsworth (1966b) 449.
76 See Van Dongen (2014a) 150 et seq. Furthermore, according to the Luig (1969) 225, 237, the 
proximate cause rule corresponds, as a result, to the prevailing theory of culpa maior in the period of 
usus modernus.
77 See also Van Dongen & Verdam (2016) 63.
78 Brock v. Copeland (1794) 170 E.R. 329.
79 See also Turk (1950) 195.
335THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPT OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE...
old doctrine in terms of negligence. These occur in the 16th and 17th centuries, when the 
concept of negligence, as a ground for liability, worked its way into common law.80 In some 
of these cases the courts solved contributory negligence by considering the element of 
negligence, i.e. by denying the claim because the injured party himself had been negligent.81 
Two examples will be given. In the first case, Bayley v. Merrel (1615), the defendant had 
hired the plaintiff to carry a load of madder (a herb which was commonly used as a dye) 
from Exhall to Uppingham and fraudulently deceived him regarding the weight of the 
goods. Seven of the plaintiff’s horses died because the goods were too heavy. The Court 
denied the horse owner’s claim despite the apparent fraud as it considered that the accident 
was due to the owner’s – gross – negligence for making a horse carry a weight which far 
exceeded the declared weight without noticing or checking the true weight.82 In the second 
case, Cruden v. Fentham (1799), a defendant drove on the wrong side of the road while the 
plaintiff was on horseback. Although the road was wide enough for both to pass without 
difficulty, the plaintiff crossed over to the side where the carriage was being driven. The 
horse was killed in endeavoring to pass between the carriage and the pavement.83 Lord 
Kenyon informed the jury that the plaintiff had thus voluntarily put himself in the way of 
danger. This argumentation, although not followed by the jury,84 was clearly based on 
negligence rather than causation.
3.2. 19th and 20th century England
3.2.1. Butterfield v. Forrester: the idea of ‘ordinary caution’
The concept of negligence as an independent ground for liability took shape in the 18th and 
early 19th century.85 The defence of contributory negligence originated in Butterfield v. 
Forrester (1809) – the leading case on contributory negligence in the early 19th century, 
although the case itself did not mention the term contributory negligence.86 The case 
concerned a man riding a horse who drove into a pole erected on a public road and was 
thrown of his horse and injured. The man was denied his claim for damages because he was 
found to have ridden at extreme speed, not taking ordinary care. According to the judge 
before whom this case was brought at first instance, an injured party could not recover his 
loss if he could have avoided the accident or injury by exercising ‘ordinary caution’. 
A subsequent move for an appeal was rejected by Lord Chief Justice Ellenborough (1750–
1818), who declared, without any supporting authority:
‘A party is not to cast himself upon an obstruction which has been made by the fault of 
another, and avail himself of it, if he do not himself use common and ordinary caution to be 
in the right. In cases of persons riding upon what is considered to be the wrong side of the 
road that would not authorize another purposely to ride up against them. One person in fault 
will not dispense with another’s using ordinary care for himself. Two things must concur to 
80 Heuston & Buckley (1996) 485.
81 See also Koppe (1970) 33 et seq., and also Van Dongen & Verdam (2016) 63–4.
82 Bayley v. Merrel (1615) 79 E.R. 331.
83 Cruden v. Fentham (1799) 170 E.R. 496.
84 Cruden v. Fentham (1799) 170 E.R. 496.
85 Harper & James (1956) 1195.
86 Butterfield v. Forrester (1809) 11 East 60/103 E.R. 926 (K.B. 1809). 
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support this action, an obstruction in the road by the fault of the defendant, and no want of 
ordinary care to avoid it on part of the plaintiff.’87
Although there was no doubt that the defendant’s careless conduct was a significant 
cause of the damage, he was not held liable because the court ascribed the accident to the 
carelessness of the injured party who had ridden violently through the unlit streets and had 
not detected the obstacle in time. Therefore the accident had occurred entirely as a result of 
the plaintiff’s own fault.88 The rationale of the decision is that the contributory negligence 
of the injured party is a complete defence against an action in negligence for any claim for 
damages. This leads to the extreme rule that even the slightest amount of contributory 
negligence bars the injured party’s action, even though the wrongdoer’s negligence might 
have been far more severe.89 Remarkably, this rule was readily accepted as a well-settled 
rule – without any arguments made against it and this prejudiced the law for the following 
140 years.90 If damage was caused by both parties, neither of them could recover anything 
from the other; ‘The loss lies where it falls’.91 
Doctrinal justifications for the denial of claims for damages in case of contributory 
conduct by the injured party are mainly found in the theory of causality. In the event of 
contributory negligence, the act of the injured party, rather than that of the wrongdoer, is 
regarded as the proximate cause.92 Historically, the development of the doctrine of 
contributory negligence can be understood in light of the context at the time. Several factors 
might have played a role in the ready acceptance of the rule in Butterfield v. Forrester. 
While the doctrine has been explained from the perspective of policy and has been attributed 
a certain penal function,93 it has also been explained as a demonstration of the individuality 
of early capitalism and been attributed to the rise of the Industrial Revolution and the 
expansion of the economy94 or the historical inertia of common law.95 Its development 
might have been encouraged by the uneasy distrust of the plaintiff-minded jury in the earlier 
part of the 19th century; the desire to keep the liabilities of growing industries within 
boundaries, as well as the tendency of the courts to look for the proximate cause of every 
injury and the inability of the courts to conceive a satisfactory method for the partition of 
damages in the case of a single injury.96 
87 Butterfield v. Forrester (1809) 11 East 60/103 E.R. 926 (K.B. 1809).
88 See also Koppe (1970) 28 et seq.
89 Swisher (2011) 359.
90 Bohlen (1907–8) 233; Koppe (1970) 28.
91 Williams (1945) 106. 
92 Landon (1951) 356; Koppe (1970) 30. Other possible justifications provided are based on the 
voluntary assumption of risk or the idea that the injured party should come to court with ‘clean hands’ 
or are derived from the construction of the injured party and the wrongdoer as joint tortfeasors. See 
Keeton et al. (1984) 452; Schofield (1889–90) 267 et seq.; Koppe (1970) 30. Elaborately on the 
dogmatic justifications of the doctrine of contributory negligence see Wester (1976) 21 et seq.
93 Schofield (1889–90) 270, 271. See also Landon (1951) 354.
94 Suggested as a reason in the US by Swisher (2011) 362, but also applicable in the UK. See 
also Turk (1950) 198. Furthermore, according to Bohlen, the most important reason to adhere to the 
strict form of contributory negligence until the contemporary period was the spirit of the age of 
liberalism it came to meet. See Bohlen (1906–7) 17 et seq., note 2, who argues that the form of 
contributory negligence is possibly the strongest expression that the individualism has found in the 
law.
95 Koppe (1970) 31.
96 These factors are taken from Keeton et al. (1984) 452 et seq.
337THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPT OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE...
3.2.2. Award of damages despite negligence
The rule in Butterfield v. Forrester that an injured party could not recover if there was any 
negligence on his part was followed in other early 19th century cases. A very strict 
interpretation of the rule can be found in Hawkins v. Cooper, in which a horse and cart 
knocked down a woman while she was crossing the road. The cart was driving on the wrong 
side of the road in order to overtake an omnibus, and the horse was found not having a 
proper bit. The judge of the Court of Common Pleas instructed the jury that they could only 
find for the woman if the accident was attributable to the driver’s fault and ‘to that, and that 
alone’.97 If, on the other hand, the accident was occasioned in any degree by improper 
conduct by the woman herself, the jury had to deny an action for damages.98 A parallel can 
be drawn with the civil law, where this denial of a claim for damages in cases of contributory 
negligence was also still applied in the early 19th century.99
Although the consequences of this rule might seem very far-reaching, juries, who 
judge upon questions of fact, might have neglected less significant contributions of injured 
parties while, strictly speaking, such a contribution was indeed present.100 This was the case 
in Vanderplank v. Miller (1828), where the jury understood the judge’s instruction that the 
plaintiff’s action could only be maintained if there was no want of care on both sides and 
that the accident was entirely attributable to the fault of the defendants. Although there 
seems to have been some careless acts on the side of the plaintiff, these were not considered 
as such, as the jury maintained the action for the plaintiffs.101 Thus the all-or-nothing rule 
might have been applied less harshly than it seems at first sight.
In other cases, the idea of ‘ordinary’ care seems to act more as a threshold, in the sense 
that the amount of negligence on the part of the injured party, to deprive him of his action, 
must be such that he did not exercise ordinary care. If there was some negligence on the 
part of the injured party, but not to such a degree that it can be said that he did not exercise 
ordinary care, his claim would be upheld. Examples of cases in which the injured party was 
excused from his negligence because it was insignificant compared to the improper 
behaviour of the wrongdoer cannot only be found traffic accidents cases but also in cases 
concerning trespass, theft, the demolition of a house and accidents between boats navigating 
on a river.102 Thus, the ordinary care doctrine in these cases was dealt with in a way that 
created some room for judgements in which the injured party was awarded the total amount 
of damages regardless of the negligence on his part. 
In 1838, this interpretation of the ordinary care rule was confirmed by the Court of 
Exchequer in Bridge v. Grand Junction Railway Company, a case concerning a collision 
between two trains. In this case, Mr. Justice Parke explicitly acknowledged the idea that the 
plaintiff could be entitled to recover damages even when he had been negligent. This is 
only different when the plaintiff could have avoided the consequences of the defendant’s 
  97 Hawkins v. Cooper (1838) 3 Car. & P. 474.
  98 Even if the preponderant blame was of the wrongdoer, see Lord Campbell in Dowell v. 
General Steam Navigation Company (1855) 119 E.R. 454 (459).
  99 See Van Dongen (2014a).
100 Koppe (1970) 37.
101 Vanderplank v. Miller (1828) 173 E.R. 1119 (1120). 
102 For examples see: Chaplin v. Hawes and Others (1828) 172 E.R. 543, Davies v. Mann 
(1848) 152 E.R. 588 and Thorogood v. Bryan (1849) 137 E.R. 452, Bird v. Holbrook (1828) 130 E.R. 
911, Lynch v. Nurdin (1841) 113 E.R. 1041, Jordin v. Crump (1841) 151 E.R. 1256, Barnes v. Ward 
(1850) 175 E.R. 277, Walters v. Pfeil (1829) 173 E.R. 1189 and Sills v. Brown (1840) 173 E.R. 452. 
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negligence by ordinary care, because in that case he is regarded as the author of his own 
wrong.103 The negligence of the injured party could therefore no longer be used to deny his 
claim for damages, unless his negligence was the direct cause of the injury.104 Later cases in 
the following years echoed this reasoning, with judges centring their judgment around the 
question whether the plaintiff had “substantially” or “fairly” contributed to the accident.105 
In 1840, Mr. Justice Coleridge ruled that what mattered was not whether the injured party 
had contributed to the extent of the injury or damages, but whether he had (substantially) 
contributed to the occurrence of the injury in the case Sills v. Brown.106 Later cases often 
referred to this consideration.
The courts no longer seemed to consider just any degree of contributory negligence to 
be enough to bar someone from claiming damage; the negligence had to be substantial. 
The role of the injured party’s fault in relation to the wrongful behaviour on the part of the 
defendant in causing the injury was also investigated. The relevance of the way in which 
the faults on both sides related both to each other and to the accident also appears from the 
quote of Sir W.H. Maule (1788–1858), a judge of the Court of Common Pleas, that ‘there 
may be a distinction between cases where the act of the defendant is an unlawful act, and 
those in which the injury arises out of a matter of negligence only’.107 Apparently, the 
seriousness of the fault had become important for the consequences of the contributory 
negligence of the injured party.
 
3.2.3. Davies v. Mann and the last opportunity rule
As shown in the previous section, the question whether the injured party’s conduct was 
culpable was eclipsed by the inquiry into whose behaviour came last in the early 19th 
century. Although there were still some cases in which theories of causal computation could 
be discerned, the focus came to lie on the extent of the culpability on the side of the injured 
party. The attention given to the timing of the parties’ respective negligence in the courts of 
Kings Bench and Common Pleas would, however, re-emerge after the decision in Davies v. 
Mann in 1842.108 Around the middle of the 19th century, the requirement of a substantial 
contribution to the accident developed into the ‘last opportunity rule’, which locates the 
blame on the party that had the last chance to avoid the accident or injury. This rule frames 
contributory negligence in terms of causation, like earlier cases in which terms of causation 
were used,109 and centres the judgement around the question whether a causal link can be 
established between the behaviour of the injured party and the (occurrence of) the accident.
103 Bridge v. Grand Railway Company (1838) 150 E.R. 1134.
104 See Harper & James (1956) 1243.
105 Phrases like this can be found in Sills v. Brown (1840) 173 E.R. 452; Thorogood v. Bryan 
(1849) 137 E.R. 452; Senior v. Ward (1859) 1 EL. & EL. 387; Morgan v. Rarey (1860) 175 E.R. 1062 
and also in the commentary of Foster & Finlason on Springett v. Ball (1865) 4 F. & F. 471. These 
cases are discussed more elaborately in Van Dongen (2016) 67.
106 Sills v. Brown (1840) 173 E.R. 452.
107 See Marriot v. Stanley (1840) 133 E.R. 458. 
108 See Harper & James (1956) 1242, who refer amongst others to Vanderplank v. Miller (1828), 
Luxford v. Large (1833), Pluckwell v. Wilson (1832), Sills v. Brown (1840), Raisin v. Mitchell (1839).
109 The use of causal imputation in early common law was discussed in Section 3.1.2. Examples 
of 19th century cases in which terms of causation can be found are Flower v. Adam (1810) 127 E.R. 
1098 and Deane v. Clayton (1817) 129 E.R. 196.
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The leading direction on the last opportunity rule was given in Davies v. Mann (1842). 
In this case, someone negligently driving a wagon hit a donkey that had been left behind on 
the road. At first instance, Mr. Justice Erskine argued that, while it might have been illegal 
to leave the donkey behind, the owner of the donkey could still maintain an action against 
the driver if the proximate cause of the injury was attributable to the want of proper conduct 
on the driver’s part.110 On appeal, the defendant argued that Mr. Justice Erskine should have 
adhered to the principle of law that where an accident was the result of faults on both sides, 
neither party could maintain an action.111 The Court of Exchequer, however, reached the 
same conclusion as Mr. Justice Erskine. According to Mr. Justice (Baron) Parke: ‘the mere 
fact of negligence on the part of the plaintiff in leaving his donkey on the public highway 
was no answer to the action, unless the donkey’s being there was the immediate cause of 
the injury’.112 There is no claim for damages if the immediate cause of the accident lies in 
the behaviour of the injured party, or, as it is often put, if the injured party’s fault has 
‘directly contributed’ to the occurrence of the injury. The key question is thus which party 
had the last, and therefore the better, opportunity to avoid the damage; that party should 
then bear the damage.113
After the introduction of the last opportunity rule, the legal basis for this rule was 
questioned. One view based the rule on the intensity of fault or on comparative fault; the 
fault of the person who had the last opportunity to avoid the damage would be considered 
more serious than the fault of the other party.114 Another view focussed on the causal 
character between the fault and the damage; the fault of the injured party was not the legal 
or proximate cause of the damage if the wrongdoer could have avoided the damage i.e., 
contributory negligence then breaks the link between the fault of the wrongdoer and the 
damage which occurred.115 Quite possibly the only reason for the last opportunity rule was 
the growing aversion to the contributory negligence rule.116 In that sense the case law, based 
on equity, intended to mitigate the rigidness of the old contributory negligence rule.117
 
3.2.4. Confirmation of the last opportunity rule
The ruling in Davies v. Mann set a standard for following cases.118 In Tuff v. Warman, a case 
brought before the Exchequer Chamber in 1858, Mr. Justice Wightman ruled that the proper 
question to put to the jury in a case concerning contributory negligence should be:
110 Davies v. Mann (1848) 152 E.R. 588.
111 Davies v. Mann (1848) 152 E.R. 588. A similar judgment was delivered a few years earlier, 
in 1832, in the case of Vennall v. Garner (1832) 149 E.R. 298, a case in which two ships had collided. 
There it was decided that if an accident was the result of combined negligence, neither can recover 
against the other.
112 Davies v. Mann (1848) 152 E.R. 588.
113 Jansen (2007) 668.
114 According to MacIntyre (1940) 1225, the underlying reason for the escape from the 
harshness of the contributory negligence bar in last clear chance cases is that the defendant’s 
negligence was relatively greater than that of the plaintiff.
115 Weyts (2003) 331, with references.
116 See also Williams (1951) 247; Keeton (1984) 464.
117 Williams (1951) 236; Koppe (1970) 42.
118 In Dowell v. General Steam Navigation Company (1855) 119 E.R. 454 (459), for example, 
Mr. Justice Campbell explicitly referred to Davies v. Mann whilst applying the last opportunity rule. 
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‘whether the damage was occasioned entirely by the negligence or improper conduct 
of the defendant, or whether the plaintiff himself so far contributed to the misfortune, that, 
but for his own negligence or want of ordinary and common care and caution on his part, 
the misfortune would not have happened. In the first case, the plaintiff would be entitled to 
recover, in the latter not; as, but for his own fault, the misfortune would not have happened. 
Mere negligence or want of ordinary care or caution would not, however, disentitle him to 
recover, unless it were such, that, but for that negligence or want of ordinary care and 
caution, the misfortune could not have happened; nor, if the defendant might by the exercise 
of care on his part have avoided the consequences of the neglect or carelessness of the 
plaintiff.’119
This question, which is a clear application of the rule in Davies v. Mann, was 
subsequently referred to as the standard when it comes to contributory negligence.120 
In 1875, the last opportunity rule even made it to the House of Lords. In Radley v. London 
and North Western Railway Company, a truck had been left behind by its owners and was 
subsequently damaged. The House of Lords decided that the accident would not even have 
happened if the truck had not been left behind but it would not be enough to prevent the 
injured party from recovering damages. The House acknowledged the general proposition 
that a plaintiff could not recover if they contributed to the accident but also noted that the 
last opportunity rule was ‘equally well established’ and concluded that this rule could thus 
not be ignored. The original direction to the jury, which claimed that the accident must be 
caused ‘solely by the negligence of the defendant’ in order for the plaintiff to recover, was 
judged to be contrary to the last opportunity rule and wrong in point of law.121 The House of 
Lords thereby confirmed the last opportunity rule and the judgements in Davies v. Mann 
and Tuff v. Warman on which this rule was based.
 
3.3. The extension and the restriction of the last opportunity rule
In 1916, the Privy Council in the Loach case stretched the last opportunity rule to include 
cases in which the defendant did not in fact have the last opportunity to avoid the disaster 
but would have had such an opportunity if he had exercised due care.122 The person who 
would have had the last opportunity to avoid the damage if he had exercised due care (the 
constructive last opportunity) had to bear the damage123 – this preceding negligent act being 
the decisive cause of the damage. The same reasoning can be found in some cases over the 
next two decades.124 The rule was extended in The Eurymedon (1938) where the Court of 
Appeal applied the rule from the Loach case to contemporaneous negligence. It was stated 
that if one of the parties (the plaintiff or the defendant) in a common law action had actually, 
119 Tuff v. Warman (1858) 5 C.B. (N.S.) 572.
120 See, e.g., Walton v. The London, Brighton and South Coast Railway Company (1868), H. & 
R. 424 and Witherley v. The Regent’s Canal Company (1862) 176 E.R. 28. 
121 Radley v. London and North Western Railway Company (1875) L.R. 10 Ex. 100. See also 
Lord Blackburn in Dublin Wicklow & Wexford Ry. v. Slattery (1878) 3 App. Cas. 1207 (if the injured 
party by exercising due care could have avoided the consequence of the wrongdoer’s negligence he 
cannot recover).
122 British Columbia Electric Railway v. Loach (1916) 1 AC 719. It has been argued that in this 
case it superseded the last opportunity rule in favour of the rule of greater fault. See also MacIntyre 
(1940) 1245 et seq.; Williams (1945) 107.
123 Weyts (2003) 330. 
124 See Koppe (1970) 44, with references.
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by observation, been aware of the negligence of the other party and failed to exercise 
reasonable care towards the negligent injured party, then that party was solely responsible.125 
In this case neither party had had the last opportunity to avoid the damage, but one would 
have had this opportunity, because one would have been aware of the danger, if it had not 
been for his own negligence.126
A first restriction of this rule was made by the House of Lords in Volute (1922), which 
only applies when a clear line between contributing acts can be made. When two acts can 
be distinguished in time, only the second one is relevant; however, when this is not the case 
and when the second act stands in such a close relation to the first that it would not have 
been possible without the preconditions set by that act, the plaintiff can also rely on the first 
negligent act, so that the contributory negligence doctrine applies here.127 A second 
restriction was applied in Swadling v. Cooper (1930), concerning a collision between a 
motor car and a motor cycle, where the judge, at first instance, directed the jury that if they 
found both parties to be substantially to blame for the accident, they should absolve the 
defendant. According to this judge, the element of who was responsible for the last act of 
negligence did not necessarily need to play a role. The Court of Appeal set the decision 
aside because the principles of the last opportunity rule had not been respected. In contrast 
the House of Lords decided that from the moment the parties became aware of their 
respective positions, there could have been no time for the defendant to take any action to 
avoid the impact and therefore the negligence of both parties had contributed to the 
collision.128 The applicability of the last opportunity rule for cases of simultaneous 
negligence was denied; the jury had to decide which fault preponderantly caused the 
damage that occurred.129
3.4. Towards partial damages in English common law
Although the general approach to contributory negligence in relation to the partition of 
damages as recorded in the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act of 1945 (see below) 
seems to have been one of ‘all or nothing’, the law in action might have been different. 
Juries often allowed recovery in cases of contributory negligence and a compromise in the 
jury room resulted in some diminution of the damages awarded due to the fault of the 
injured party (see below). These juries had a good precedent for their rulings: the admiralty 
courts – which based their decisions on admiralty law, not common law – used the same 
rule as juries in cases of contributory negligence (weighing the negligence of both parties 
and striking a balance between them).130 Various variants of damage partition can be 
found.131 The simplest possible and the oldest method of apportionment is to divide the 
damages equally between the negligent parties. This was the method which had been 
developed, around 1700, by the English admiralty courts,132 which had no jury and were 
125 The Eurymedon (1938) 41; Williams (1951) 224.
126 Williams (1951) 225. 
127 Admiralty Commissioners v. S.S. Volute (1922) 1 AC 129 (HL); Wester (1976) 101.
128 Swadling v. Cooper (1930) [1931] AC 1.
129 Koppe (1970) 48.
130 Ulman (1933) 33.
131 The idea of the distribution of damages as mentioned in Exodus XXI.35–36 can also be 
found in Anglo-Saxon England in law 23 of the laws of King Ine. See Thorpe (2004) 51.
132 Beckham v. Chapman (1695) Burrell 270, 167 E.R. 568; Noden v. Ashton (1706) Burell 290, 
167 E.R. 577. See McGuffie (1953) 142 et seq.
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strongly influenced by international rules derived from the civil law.133 The rules which 
were applied in the earliest decisions in collision cases were not uniform.134 This was settled 
in 1815 in The Woodrop-Sims when it was decided that a partition in halves was also to be 
applied when faults were not equally serious;135 where a collision is caused by want or due 
diligence or of skill of both sides, the loss must be apportioned between them.136 However 
this may be, English law continued to adhere to this rule of equal partition137 until the 
enactment of the Maritime Convention Act in 1911, when it conformed with (Article 4 of) 
the Brussels Maritime Convention of 1910138 by adopting a statute providing for a division 
of the damages ‘in proportion to the degree in which each vessel was at fault.’139
In the common law, the principle of the partition of damages was not officially 
introduced until the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act of 1945.140 The case of 
Cayzer, Irvine & Co. v. Carron Co. (1884) made it clear that the practices of Admiralty law 
did not extend to common law. In this case, which was brought before the Admiralty 
division of the House of Lords, Lord Blackburn (1813–1886) declared that ‘the rule of 
[common, EvD & HV] law is that if the blame causing the accident lies on both sides, 
however small that blame may be on one side, the loss lies where it falls’, thereby rejecting 
the application of a partition of damages outside the scope of Admiralty law.141 Within the 
common law, one had still to abide by the traditional ‘all or nothing’ rule.
However, as already mentioned above, juries might have often disregarded the official 
rule in favour of the mitigation or partition of damages. Several examples can be found in 
19th century case law. In Smith v. Dobson (1841) where, despite the fact that strict 
instructions were given to the jury as to the effect of contributory negligence (namely, an 
absolute bar), the jury decided to award one quarter of the damages. The reasoning of the 
jury based on comparative faults was left unaffected on appeal.142 Another example is the 
case of Raisin v. Mitchell brought before the Court of Common Pleas in 1839. This case 
concerned an accident between two ships. One of the ships ran into the other ship, causing 
it to sink. The defence claimed that there were several factors on the side of the injured ship 
that contributed to the accident. After hearing the case, the jury decided to award only half 
of the damages claimed. This partial award of damages came as a surprise to both parties as 
well as to the judge, Lord Chief Justice N.C. Tindal (1776–1846), who had not given any 
instruction in this direction. When asked for a clarification, the foreman of the jury declared 
that ‘there were faults on both sides’.143 Despite the objections of the defendant, Tindal 
133 Prosser (1953) 475. See also Turk (1950) 226 et seq.
134 Hillyer (1936) 115.
135 McGuffie (1953) 144.
136 The Woodrop-Sims (1815) 165 E.R. 1422. 
137 Hay v. La Neve (1824) 2 Shaw Sc. App. Cas. 395; The Milan (1861) 167 E.R. 167; Cayzer, 
Irvine & Co. v. Carron Co. (1884) 9 AC 873.
138 I.e. the International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules to Govern the Liability 
of Vessels in Case of Collisions, and a protocol thereto (signed in Brussels on 23 September 1910). 
For the text see e.g. Knauth (1958) 39 et seq. (see especially Art. 4, on p. 39).
139 See Maritime Conventions Act of 1911, 1 & 2 George V, c. 57, § 1 (1). This provision 
provided that if, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, it is not possible to establish 
different degrees of fault, the liability shall be apportioned equally.
140 See 8 & 9 Geo. VI, c. 28.
141 Cayzer, Irvine & Co. v. Carron Co. (1884) 9 AC.
142 Smith v. Dobson (1841) 133 E.R. 1057; MacIntyre (1940) 1229 et seq.
143 Raisin v. Mitchell (1839) 173 E.R. 979. See also MacIntyre (1940) 1229.
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upheld the verdict after the jury confirmed that they had considered the whole matter. Raisin 
v. Mitchell thus offers a practical application of the principle of the partition of damages 
long before it became an official rule. In their report of the case a few years later, Carrington 
and Payne noted that the verdict ‘seems to be quite correct and sustainable in point of 
law’ and substantiated their judgement with references to earlier cases such as Bridge v. 
Grand Junction Railway Company, Marriot v. Stanley and Sills v. Brown.144 Remarkably, 
Carrington and Payne seem to have considered the decision to award partial damages to be 
in line with the last opportunity rule, which could also be discerned in other cases around 
the same period, almost viewing it as a logical conclusion to these developments.145
Signs of a discussion about the consequences of the all-or-nothing rule can also be 
found in two cases from 1850, Greenland v. Chaplin and Rigby v. Hewitt. In both cases the 
jury had awarded, contrary to their instruction by the judge, full damages to the injured 
party, despite evidence of (some) contributory negligence on his side.146 When the cases 
were brought before Mr. Justice C.E. Pollock on appeal, he repealed the jury decisions, but 
did express his doubts as to whether the consequences of the current doctrine would be 
appropriate in all cases. In Greenland v. Chaplin Pollock admitted that he was not sure 
whether it would be reasonable to hold a person responsible for ‘all the consequences which 
may under any circumstances arise, and in respect of mischief which could by no possibility 
have been foreseen, and which no reasonable person would have anticipated’.147 In Rigby v. 
Hewitt, Pollock similarly remarked that he had some doubts as to the extent of the damages 
which were recoverable.148 He acknowledged that a person should be responsible for all 
foreseeable consequences, but seemed to have had some doubts concerning the coverage of 
consequences that no one could have foreseen. In both cases, however, the emphasis of 
Pollock’s comments seems to lie on the causal link to the damage, which should not be too 
remote from the accident itself, and less on the rules regarding contributory negligence. 
Moreover, Pollock was very careful to point out that these doubts did not apply to the cases 
at hand and he went to great lengths to clarify that he did not want to question earlier 
precedents or to go against the doctrine as a whole.149
The case of Springett v. Ball, which occurred about ten years later, in 1865, is even 
more interesting in the context of contributory negligence. In this case, the jury came to a 
verdict similar to the one in Raisin v. Mitchell.150 Although the judge’s direction to the jury 
in this case was along the same lines as the last opportunity rule, the jury seemed to have 
considered the outcome of that rule to be unsatisfactory and they awarded mitigated 
damages instead. Although the jury did not explicitly state their reason for doing this, Chief 
Justice Sir Alexander J.E. Cockburn (1802–1880) noted that ‘it is evidently the result of a 
compromise’. From his conclusion that the jury obviously evaded ‘the difficulty and 
responsibility of a decision’, which was ‘most unsatisfactory’, it is clear the Chief Justice 
was not very pleased with the verdict. The commentary accompanying the report of this 
case in Foster & Finlason’s law reports is not very positive either. The commentary argues 
144 Commentary of Carrington & Payne on Raisin v Mitchell (1839) Car. & P. 613. 
145 Commentary of Carrington & Payne on Raisin v Mitchell (1839) Car. & P. 613. 
146 Commentary of Carrington & Payne on Raisin v Mitchell (1839) Car. & P. 613. See also 
Foster & Finlason’s commentary on Springett v. Ball (1865) 4 F. & F. 471.
147 Greenland v. Chaplin (1850) 155 E.R. 104
148 Rigby v. Hewitt (1850) 155 E.R. 104.
149 Greenland v. Chaplin (1850) 155 E.R. 104
150 Springett v. Ball (1865), 4 F. & F. 471.
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that the incident either occurs or does not and thus there is no question of any degree when 
considering who caused it thereby giving a clear insight into the arguments against the 
partition of damages.151
All in all, it is interesting to note that all three juries in Smith v. Dobson, Raisin v. 
Mitchell and Springett v. Ball quite independently of each other decided to mitigate the 
awarded damages. Apparently there was a shared sense in these cases that the all-or-nothing 
approach when awarding damages was unfair in the given circumstances. Not everyone 
shared this outlook. Although the jury’s verdict in Raisin v. Mitchell was considered to be in 
line with earlier case law (by Carrington and Payne), a similar verdict in Springett v. Ball 
was met with harsh criticism. Likewise, in the Exchequer Chamber Mr. Justice Pollock 
expressed some doubts on the matter in both Greenland v. Chaplin and Rigby v. Hewitt, he 
was very careful not to go too far in his suggestions and also made sure to show his 
deference to the contemporary regime of awarding either all, or none of the damages. Thus, 
it is not surprising that it would still take several decades until these ideas made it into 
legislative drafting i.e., in 1945. Meanwhile, the broadening of the last opportunity rule had 
paved the way for a less stringent understanding of contributory negligence.
The principle that an injured party who was partly responsible for his own harm could 
not recover damages in tort would remain the official doctrine until the Law Reform 
(Contributory Negligence) Act of 1945. Section 1 (1) of this at provided the rule that in 
such cases the claim does not fail but the defence of contributory negligence may apply and 
if it applies it may lead to a reduction of the amount of damages to be paid. This reduction 
is based on the respective degrees of the responsibility of the parties. The question to be 
answered is not only to what extent the behaviour involved was likely to cause the event, 
but above all what is needed is a balancing of the respective faults by the judge.152 
Ultimately decisive is what the court/judge considers to be ‘just and equitable’.153 With the 
Act, the contributory negligence rule, with its all-or-nothing approach, and the last 
opportunity rule became inoperative.154
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In order to rethink the differences and similarities between the common and civil law 
tradition as to the issue of the role and consequences of the contributory conduct of the 
injured party that contributed to his own loss in the law of delicts, this article has described 
the development of the solutions and consequences provided in civil law and (English) 
common law. The solutions found in common law are not as different from the ones in civil 
law; even before a concept of contributory negligence existed there might have been 
remarkable similarities in the way one solved this issue. Interestingly, in both (medieval) 
canon law as in various early modern cases in common law (and even some in civil law) the 
contributory conduct was considered from a viewpoint of causation: the wrongdoer’s act 
had to be the proximate cause of the damage. Nevertheless, the gradual acceptance of the 
concept of negligence – which was already present early in the civil law tradition due to the 
influence of Roman law thereon – can be seen in common law in the early modern period 
151 Commentary on Springett v. Ball (1865) in 4 F. & F. 471.
152 Looschelders (1999) 95. See Denning L.J. in Davies v. Swan Motor Co. Ltd. [1949] 2 K.B. 
291 (326).
153 See also Honoré (1983) 123 et seq.
154 See Looschelders (1999) 96, with further references.
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too, and in some cases the negligence of the injured party was already considered. In both 
legal traditions the result of ‘contributory negligence’ was one of ‘all or nothing’. Moreover, 
in both traditions, the way in which cases involving contributory negligence were dealt with 
slowly developed from a very strict rule, depriving the injured party of its action even in the 
presence of the slightest degree of negligence on their side, into a more lenient approach, 
in which attempts aimed at doing justice to the relation in which both parties contributed to 
the accident were made during the 19th century. The English introduction of the last 
opportunity rule resembles the developments on the continent to a certain degree, because it 
shifts the focus increasingly to the seriousness of the faults rather than looking solely at the 
occurrence of the negligence, although the rule places the emphasis more on the timing of 
the negligence. Thoughts on a partition of damages, which was first applied in civil law 
jurisdictions in the second half of the 19th century, can be discerned in some 19th century 
cases in English common law too, as the discussion of the remarks of Justice Pollock have 
illustrated. Moreover, juries would regularly have mitigated the damages they awarded, 
rather than applying the all-or-nothing rule. The idea of a partition of damages thus seems 
to have emerged in English common law around the same time as the introduction of the 
principle in civil law. Finally, common law introduced the possibility of a reduction, based 
on the respective degrees of responsibility of the parties in 1945, just as civil law 
jurisdictions did in the 19th and 20th century. Thus, there are some clear similarities in the 
development of the concept of ‘contributory negligence’ in both the civil law tradition and 
the common law tradition – indicating that these two legal families might not be as far 
detached from each other – in the periods studied – as is often believed. 
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